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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This is an Appeal from an Order dated March 9, 1992, 
issued by the Honorable Gordon J. Low, First District for Cache 
County, State of Utah. Although this appeal was originally filed 
by Appellant with the Utah Supreme Court which had original 
jurisdiction, that Court assigned the case to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(J) (1991) and Rule 3 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The only issue presented for this Court to decide is 
whether or not there was substantial evidence to support the Order 
issued by the First District Court in this matter. In determining 
that issue, three (3) subsidiary issues are presented. They are: 
(1) Is the Appellant limited to arguing on appeal only 
those issues identified in his Docketing Statement; 
(2) Did the Trial Court properly calculate Appellant's 
right to the proceeds from the sale of joint property and correctly 
offset that amount against Appellee's alimony arrearages; and, 
(3) What is the proper rate of prejudgment interest to 
be applied on the alimony arrearages. 
In domestic relation matters, Trial Courts are afforded 
broad discretion as long as that discretion is exercised within the 
confines of legal precedence. Whitehead v. Whiteheadf 193 Utah 
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Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (Utah App. 1992), Cumminas v. Cumminas, 821 P.2d 
472, 474-75 (Utah App. 1991). The Appellate Court must afford the 
Trial Court "considerable latitude in adjusting financial and 
property interests, and its actions are entitled to a presumption 
of validity." Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah App. 
1988). The Appellate Court must presume the correctness of the 
trial Court's decision absent "manifest injustice or inequity that 
indicates a clear abuse of ... discretion." Hansen v. Hansen, 736 
P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah App. 1987). 
In order to successfully challenge the Trial Court's 
Findings, the Appellant is required to marshall all the evidence 
supporting the Court's Finding and demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient to support that Finding. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE/RULE 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 15-1-1(2) (1989), Revised 
Code of Washington, Section 19.52.010 (1) and Rule 9 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure are applicable to the resolution of 
this matter. Those statutes and rules are set forth verbatim were 
applicable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from an Order issued by the First 
District Court in the above matter, vitiating all interest, equity 
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or claim Appellant had in the equity of a certain parcel of real 
property located in Logan, Utah and, after offsetting said equity, 
awarding Appellee judgment in the sum of $16, 886.54 for unpaid 
alimony. 
Course of Proceedings. 
Plaintiff/Appellant filed his Complaint against Defen-
dant/Appellee seeking payment of the "net proceeds" from the sale 
of the parties home. Defendant/Appellee counterclaimed for unpaid 
alimony arrearages. Trial was held on December 17, 1991. 
Disposition Below. 
The Honorable Gordon J. Low of the First Judicial 
District Court of Cache County, State of Utah after trial found 
that at the time of the sale of the real property under a real 
estate contract, with installment payments, that the Plaintiff/ 
Appellant equity would at maximum be $33,000.00. (R. at 392). The 
Court further found that the Plaintiff/Appellant was in arrears in 
his alimony obligation and that even after those arrears were 
offset by his interest in the real property that there was still a 
balance owing to the Defendant/Appellee in the sum of $16,886.54. 
(R. at 356). The Court applied the Washington statutory 
prejudgment interest rate of 12% in it's calculation of the alimony 
arrearages. (T. at 83). 
Plaintiff/Appellant appealed and the Defendant/Appellee 
petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for Summary Disposition. The 
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Utah Supreme Court ordered that the case be "poured over" to the 
Utah Court of Appeals* The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for 
Summary Disposition. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties were divorced on or about the 20th day of 
October, 1980 pursuant to a Decree of Dissolution issued by the 
Superior Court of Washington for King County. (R. at 86-87, copy 
attached to Addendum as Exhibit A). The Decree provided in 
relevant part as follows: 
The home located in Logan, Utah which 
home should be sold and after payment of 
closing costs and mortgage payment, the 
proceeds divided egually between petitioner 
and respondent. Each party should be reguired 
to bear any capital gains that may be 
occasioned proportionally with all respected 
proceeds that each is paid and further that 
respondent is to pay all taxes owing 
pertaining to said property up to the date of 
closing of said sale. (R. at 86). 
* * * 
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and 
DECREED that respondent is to pay the 
petitioner the amount of $860.00 per month as 
and for maintenance to terminate only upon 
petitioner's remarriage or death. (R. at 87). 
The house was sold on or about the 30 day of June, 1985 
on a Real Estate Contract. The total purchase price was $68,000. 
There were closing costs and fees of $1,559.26. The buyer paid a 
down payment of $15,000 and the balance of $53,000 was to bear 
interest at 10 percent and was due in full on August 1, 2000. The 
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monthly payments were $515.81. (R. at 93-104, copy attached to 
Addendum as Exhibit "B"). 
Defendant/Appellee remarried on or about February 28, 
1986 at which time Plaintiff/Appellant's alimony obligation ceased 
pursuant to the terms of the Decree. (R. at 31). Plaintiff/ 
Appellant had failed to pay all the alimony payments to the 
Defendant/Appellee and the Trial Court found that at the time of 
her remarriage he was approximately $50,079.02 in arrears. (T. at 
140-141; and trial Exhibit 15, copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit 
"C".) 
On or about January 28, 1988, Plaintiff/Appellant filed 
an Amended Complaint which in relevant part sought payment of the 
"net proceeds" from the sale of the home. (R. at 11). Defendant/ 
Appellee counterclaimed for alimony arrearages. (R. at 25). 
Trial was held on December 17, 1991. (R. at 341). At 
the time of trial, Defendant/Appellant offered evidence as to the 
present value of the Real Estate Contract as of February 28, 1986 
(the date alimony terminated) was $66,389.95, of which Plaintiff/ 
Appellant would at best be entitled to one-half (1/2) or 
$33,192.48. (R. at 352). The alimony arrearages with interest 
were $50,079.02 resulting in an amount due Defendant/Appellee of 
$16,886.84 as of February 28, 1986. (R. at 352, Exhibit "C" 
herein). The Trial Court noted that Appellee had only brought the 
figures current to February of 1986 and that had figures as to the 
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amount due on the date of trial been used, the alimony arrearage 
would have been even larger* (T. at 100). 
On or about the 6th day of March, 1992, the District 
Court issued an Order which in relevant part found that Plaintiff 
/Appellant's alimony arrearages as of February 28, 1986 exceeded 
the one-half balance owing to him under the Decree by $16,886.54. 
The Court offset the Plaintiff/Appellant equity in the property and 
awarded Defendant/Appellee a judgment in the amount of $16,886.54. 
(R. at 355-358, copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit "D"). 
Plaintiff/Appellant filed this Appeal on or about April 
6, 1992, (R. at 361), alleging that he is entitled to have the 
future value of the payments under the real estate contract offset 
against the present value of his alimony arrearages. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT(S) 
The Appellant raised only one issue in his Docketing 
Statement; namely the interpretation of the term "proceeds". His 
failure to state any other issues in his Docketing Statement is and 
abandonment and waiver of those issues. Such issues, even if 
preserved at the Trial Court level can not be raised for the first 
time in Appellant's Brief. Appellant should not be allowed to 
argue any error arising from the use of the Washington prejudgment 
interest rate or the refusal to allow his alleged expert to testify 
as to the meaning to the term "proceeds" as those issued were not 
identified in his Docketing Statement. 
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There is no dispute as to the interpretation of the term 
"proceeds". All of the parties and the Trial Court are in 
agreement as to what constitutes "proceeds". Appellant's error 
arises from not reducing his future expectancy under the Real 
Estate Contract to it's present value. Appellant seeks to offset 
the unliquidated, future value of his contract payments against the 
liquidated present value of his alimony arrearages. Such a result 
is not fair, equitable or has any basis in law or logic. 
The Trial Court properly applied the Washington pre-
judgment rate of interest, as that is the rate provided in the 
jurisdiction were the obligation arose. Appellant has failed to 
marshall any of the evidence in support of the Trial Court's 
finding on this issue and on that basis alone, this Court show not 
review his assignment of error. See Scharf v. BMG Corp., supra. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE APPELLANT IS PROHIBITED FROM ARGUING ANY 
ISSUE IN HIS BRIEF WHICH WAS NOT IDENTIFIED IN 
HIS DOCKETING STATEMENT, 
Plaintiff/Appellant in his Docketing Statement states as 
follows: 
8. ISSUE FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF 
REVIEW: The issue for this Court's review is 
the interpretation of the term in paragraph B 
of the Washington Decree of Dissolution which 
ordered the division between Appellant and 
Appellee of the "proceeds" from the sale of 
the home. The Court should determine whether 
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"proceeds" means the amount of the income to 
the parties at the time of the sale in June 
1985 or whether "proceeds" means the total 
amount of money which is to be received by 
Appellee during the total time payment period 
of payments pursuant to the sale documents* 
Although Plaintiff/Appellant only identified the one 
issue as to the interpretation of the term "proceeds" from the 
parties Decree of Divorce he now seeks to add the issues of whether 
the Trial Court committed error in applying the Washington State 
statutory prejudgment interest rate of twelve percent (12%) rather 
than the Utah rate of ten percent (10%) to his alimony arrearages 
and also whether the Trial Court committed error in not allowing 
him to call a witness to offer his interpretation of the term 
"proceeds". 
Appellant should be prohibited from raising additional 
issues not previously identified in his Docketing Statement* The 
Docketing Statement required by Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure requires the Appellant to identify the issues 
that he wishes to be considered on appeal* That Rule in relevant 
part provides as follows: 
(c) The docketing statement shall contain the 
following information in the order set forth 
below: 
* * * 
(5) The issues presented by appeal, 
expressed in the terms and circumstances of 
the case, but without unnecessary detail. The 
questions should not be repetitious. General 
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conclusions such as "the judgment of the trial 
court is not supported by the law or facts," 
are not acceptable. For each issue appellant 
must state the applicable standard of 
appellate review and cite supporting 
authority. 
The Docketing Statement serves at least two very 
important functions. First, the statement of issues allows the 
Utah Supreme Court to make an informed decision as to whether the 
case should be reassigned to the Utah Court of Appeals. The 
Appellant's omission of issues which he latter intends to argue on 
appeal deprives the Supreme Court of information needed to 
determine case assignments. Secondly, the Docketing Statement 
informs all parties of the issues that will be presented on appeal 
so that they may file any appropriate Requests for Summary 
Disposition. Under Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, such Motions must be filed within ten (10) days of the 
Docketing Statement. The omission of issues later raised in 
Appellant's Brief prevents the opposing party the opportunity to 
file Motions for Summary Disposition on those matters. 
Although there is no Utah case law on this point, the 
universal weight of authority from those states which have looked 
at this issue is that issues omitted from the docketing statement 
will not be heard by the Appellate Court. See Speedie Food Mart, 
Inc. v. Taylor, 809 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Mo. Ct. App. E. Dist., Div. 
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Three, 1991) and State v. Lucero, 104 N.M. 587, 725 P.2d 266 (N.M. 
App. 1986). 
The Appellant has not filed an Motion to amend his 
Docketing Statement to include the new issues and such failure 
prevents him from raising the issues for the first time in his 
Brief. State v. Rael, 668 P.2d 309 (N.M. App. 1983). 
This Court should hold that any issues which were not 
listed in Appellant's Docketing Statement, are waived and/or 
abandoned and not subject to review by this Court. Such a holding 
will be consistent with the spirit, intent and purpose of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THE 
AMOUNT OF APPELLANT'S INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY 
AND PROPERLY CALCULATED THE AMOUNT OF THE 
OFFSET FOR ALIMONY ARREARAGES. 
A. Definition of the term "proceeds". 
Despite Plaintiff/Appellant's allegation, there is really 
no issue as to what constitutes the proceeds from the sale of the 
house. Both the parties and the Trial Court recognize that 
proceeds were what was received in payments minus costs. The 
Plaintiff/Appellant in his Docketing Statement refers to this as 
"net proceeds". Appellee and the Trial Court granted him credit 
for "the entire proceeds" and "all that was received from the 
sale". Appellee does not take issue with the authorities cited by 
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Appellant, however they do not contradict nor differ from the 
Findings, Conclusions or Order of the Trial Court* 
Thus, it is not necessary to address the issue of whether 
the Trial Court committed error in not allowing Plaintiff's alleged 
expert, Mr* Rex Fuhriman, to testify as to the interpretation of 
the term "proceeds" since there was no issue as to the proper 
interpretation of that phrase* However, even if that was an issue, 
Appellant has failed to marshall the evidence in support of the 
Trial Courts finding that Mr. Fuhriman1s testimony was irrelevant. 
This failure warrants dismissal of the alleged error. Scharf v. 
BMG Corp. supra. In addition Appellant has not proffered or 
alleged what the testimony of Mr. Fuhriman would have been or how 
it would have resulted in a different result before the Trial 
Court. 
The Trial Court in determining the amount of the 
"proceeds" which Plaintiff/Appellant was entitled to reduce the 
entire unliquidated contract future expectancy to it's present 
value. This procedure was entirely proper and in accordance with 
established law as argued below. 
B. Appellant is not entitled to use the future value of 
his contract interest to offset the present value of his alimony 
arrearage. 
Plaintiff/Appellant's argument is not as to what 
constitutes "proceeds," but rather whether he can use the future 
value of his contract interest to offset, and in fact result in a 
11 
credit against the present value of his alimony arrearages. Thus, 
the true issue presented is one of simple accounting and not of a 
definition of a legal term of art. The Plaintiff/Appellant asks 
this Court to allow him to use an unliquidated future expectancy to 
not only offset, but give him a credit, against a presently 
existing judgment for alimony arrearages. 
It is clear that the parties and the Washington Court 
contemplated that the house would be sold for a lump sum and that 
the parties would simply divide that sum minus the inherent costs 
and closing fees. Although it may not have been contemplated by 
the parties nor considered by the Court that the property might, as 
proved to be the case, be sold on a contract with payments received 
over time, it is clear that in such a case, the Court would have 
had to use the present value of the contract interest in 
apportioning the parties' shares. 
As indicated in the statement of facts above, Plaintiff/ 
Appellant's alimony obligation was $50,079.02. Said amount was to 
bear interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%). Also, the 
present value of the Plaintiff/Appellant's contract interest in the 
property was only $33,192.48. The contract was to bear interest at 
ten percent (10%) as contrasted to the twelve percent (12%) which 
the alimony arrearages accrued. Although the future value of 
Plaintiff/Appellant's contract interest as on August 1, 2000, would 
be $57,410.47 (1/2 of the total $114,820.94) the future value of 
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his alimony arrearages as of that date would be $266,468.95. Thus, 
under Plaintiff/Appellant1s theory of using future value, the 
alimony arrearage judgment would be approximately $200,000. 
The Plaintiff/Appellant1 s fundamental error is that he is 
confusing apples and oranges. He seeks to offset the present value 
of his alimony obligation against the future value of his contract 
interest. Utah law is clear that the future expectancy under the 
contract must be reduced to its present value. "The right to 
receive monies in the future is unquestionably . . . an economic 
resource subject to equitable distribution based upon proper 
computation of its present dollar value." Woodward v. Woodward, 
656 P.2d 431 (1982). (Emphasis added). 
The Plaintiff/Appellant is entitled to have the present 
value of the contract interest offset against the present value of 
his alimony arrearage. That is exactly what the Trial Court 
ordered in this case. The Order in relevant part provided as 
follows: 
2. That the alimony arrearage that the 
plaintiff owed to the defendant as of the date 
of the sale of the Logan home, once owned by 
the parties, June 30, 1985, was larger than 
one-half (1/2) of the net equity which was to 
be awarded to the plaintiff as set forth in 
page 1, paragraph b of the Decree of 
Dissolution. That as of said date, the 
balance owing after one-half (1/2) equity in 
the home is deducted for alimony arrearages 
was $9,322.83. 
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3. That the alimony arrearages owing 
from the plaintiff to the defendant as of 
February 28, 1986, the date that alimony 
ceased when offset against the equity of the 
home and the payments received on the Logan 
home left the balance owing to the defendant 
after the offset of $16,886.54. 
7. At the time of the sale of the house 
in 1985, the plaintiff would have been 
entitled to a maximum of $33,000, that at 
which time he was already in arrears in his 
alimony to a sum exceeding that. The best he 
could hope for at that point would be that 
when the house was sold that he either had 
one-half of the proceeds from each of the 
monthly installments or had the defendant 
elected, she could have paid in the $33,000. 
Since he was already in default in excess of 
that figure, his interest in the home at that 
time was liquidated and he was given credit 
for the same against the arrearage leaving a 
balance owed to the defendant in the sum of 
$16,000. (R. at 356-357). 
Thus, the Trial Court actually interpreted the facts in 
a light most favorable to the Plaintiff/Appellant. He was given 
full credit for the maximum amount that he could have been entitled 
to upon the sale of the house. That sum was insufficient, however, 
to completely offset his alimony arrearages and resulted in the 
judgment for the surplus of the amount owed. 
The Plaintiff/Appellant is not entitled to take the 
future value of his contract interest and offset it against the 
present value of the alimony arrearage. Present value must be 
contrasted against present value, not future value. If the 
Plaintiff/Appellant was intent upon utilizing the future value of 
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his contract interest, then the future value of the alimony 
arrearage should also be calculated. Since the contract only bears 
interest at the rate of ten percent (10%), while the judgment bears 
interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%), the disparity on 
August 1, 2000 (the date when the contract is finally paid) would 
be even larger. Should the Court contrast the future value of the 
contract against the future value of the alimony arrearage, the 
Plaintiff/Appellant would come out owing a judgment of 
approximately $200,000 rather than the $16,886.54 entered by the 
Court. 
C. The Trial Court properly calculated the amount of the 
alimony arrearages. 
It is not disputed that the Appellant was in arrears in 
his alimony obligations. Appellant states that at trial he claimed 
he was only in arrears in the amount of $33,655.00 (Appellant's 
Brief, page 7 and R. at 41). Appellant acknowledges that Appellee 
introduced evidence that he had failed to make alimony payments in 
the amount of $50,079.02 (which included interest at the rate of 
12%). The Trial Court accepted Appellee's calculation finding 
Appellant's calculations "totally unreliable" (T. at 140), and the 
only error that Appellant assigns is that the arrearages should 
only have borne interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) which is 
the Utah prejudgment interest rate, rather than twelve percent 
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(12%) as provided by Washington law, the State which entered the 
alimony obligation. 
It was entirely just and proper to apply the Washington 
prejudgment interest rate rather than the Utah rate* The Trial 
Court was reguired to determine the duties and obligations of the 
parties under a Washington Decree of Dissolution. In such a case, 
it was entirely proper to apply Washington law* In any event, the 
difference in the interest rate is virtually insignificant* If the 
amount of the Judgment is calculated at ten percent (10%) it would 
only be $673*37 less at 10 percent (10%). 
This is not a case of first impression in this State. 
The Courts of this State have previously ruled on the choice of law 
provisions applicable in a domestic relations matter, particularly 
as it bears on the guestion of prejudgment interest. The Utah 
conflict of laws rule is that is that substantive legal guestions 
are governed by the law of the State were the cause of action 
arose. Scott v. Scott, 19 Utah 2d 267, 430 P.2d 580 (1967). In 
Scott, the Supreme Court stated as follows: 
The right to such accrued (alimony) 
installment payments vested in the plaintiff 
upon the due date of each installment, and the 
plaintiff is entitled to interest thereon at 
the legal rate until payment is made... 
Accordingly the lower court was correct in its 
holding that it had no power or authority to 
change or modify the Nevada judgment as to the 
accrued installments of alimony thereunder. 
Id. at 583. 
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However, the Courts of this State have on numerous occasions upheld 
the principle of granting full faith and credit to foreign decrees 
in divorce cases. See Westerfield v. Coop, 6 Utah 2d 262, 311 P. 2d 
787. 
In the case of Slade v. Slade, 468 P.2d 627 (N.M. 1970), 
the parties were divorced pursuant to a Kansas Decree of Divorce 
which required the Defendant to pay child support. The Defendant 
failed to make all of his required payments and subsequently moved 
to New Mexico. Plaintiff filed suit against the Defendant in New 
Mexico seeking child support arrearages. The Defendant alleged 
that the Court should apply the New Mexico rate of prejudgment 
interest rather than the higher Kansas rate. The Trial Court 
disagreed and entered judgment for arrearages with interest at the 
Kansas rate. On appeal the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld that 
determination stating as follows: 
The issue raised by the pleadings was the 
amount to which plaintiff was entitled under 
the Kansas judgment. The theory on which the 
case was tried was the legal right of 
plaintiff to recover a money judgment based on 
her Kansas judgment. Plaintiff was entitled 
to interest on the Kansas judgment as a matter 
of law, to the same extent that she was 
entitled to the monthly payments awarded by 
that judgment. Id. at 631. 
The cases cited by Appellant are not applicable and are 
easily distinguished. Prospero Associates v. Redactron Corp., 682 
P.2d 1193 (Colo. App. 1983) is limited to cases where "the 
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prejudgment interest is not awarded pursuant to a contractual 
provision, but is awarded as an item of damages as a matter of 
law" . Id at 1200. Further the Court in that case acknowledged that 
"Colorado follows the minority rule that prejudgment interest is 
governed by the law of the forum state." (emphasis added). Id. at 
1200. 
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
The term "proceeds" as it was utilized by the Washington 
Court was understood by the trial court as well as the parties. 
The Plaintiff/Appellant seeks to contrast apples and oranges. He 
cannot be allowed to contrast the future value of the contract 
interest against the present value of his alimony obligation. The 
Tiral Court was correct in calculating the present value of 
Plaintiff/Appellant's interest and giving him full credit for the 
maximum amount he would be entitled to. Under any equitable view 
of the facts, whether contrasting present value against present 
value or future value against future value, the Plaintiff /Appellant 
still owes Defendant/Appellee for alimony arrearages which accrue 
at a greater rate that the proceeds under the contract. 
DATED this / day of November, 1992. 
HENRIKSEN, HENRIKSEN & CALL, P.C. 
OsKicLijJjLjLsuq, 
C. RICHARD HENRTIKSEN, Jr^ 
Attorney for Appellee " 
18 
•* * w true and correct copies of the 
I hereby certify that true a 
n^ied postage prepaid, on this 
• *
 nf Rnnellee were mailea, pu&u y foregoing Brief of Appene 
iQQ2 to the following: J__ day of November, 1992 ^ ^ . ^ 
Thomas L. Willinore 
OLSEN & HOGGAN, P.C. 
56 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A: Decree of Dissolution. 
EXHIBIT B: Real Estate Contract. 
EXHIBIT C; Calculation of Alimony Arrearages. 
EXHIBIT D: Order of Trial Court (March 9, 1992) 
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LOGAN DISTRICT 
• II m 3 I H W M 
2 OCT 2 01980 
3 || KING COUNTY SUPERIOR 
COURT CLERK'S OrTCE 
4 
5 II SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY 
6 In Re the Marriage of: ) 
7 GRACE DONOHUE, 
8 Petitioner, 
9 and 
10 THOMAS J, DONOHUE, 
XI Respondent 
12 
32 
NO. 80-3-04990-2 
DECREE OF DISSOLUTION 
c9iU>&l ^ 
13 THIS MATTER having come on duly and regularly before the 
14 undersigned, one of the judges of the above-entitled court, on the 
15 date last shown below, the petitioner being represented by her 
16 counselor of law, H. Michael Fields of Anderson & Fields Inc., P.S 
17 and respondent having failed to appear, although having been 
18 duly and personally served and the court being otherwise fully 
19 advised in the premises, having made its Findings of Fact and 
20 Conclusions, now, therefore, it is hereby 
21 ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the marriage of the 
22 parties be and is hereby dissolved. It is further 
23 ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the wife is awarded as 
24 her sole and separate property, free and clear of any interest in 
~c the husband, the following: 
26 A. Thirteen acres located located in Logan, Utah; 
27 II B. The home located in Logan,Utah, which home should be 
2g sold and after payment of closing costs and underlying mortgage 
29 payment, the proceeds divided equally between petitioner and 
3Q it respondent. Each party should be required to bear any capital 
<%! gains that may be occasioned proportionally with the respective 
proceeds that each is paid and further that respondent is to pay 
Decree of -Dissolution - 1 ANDERSON 4 FIELDS INC.. P.S. 
V C W J . c c v/J. y w a w ^ w w H * ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
* t » fcU VUU. 207 EAST EDGAR STREET 
SEATTLE. WASHINGTON Ml02 
FILED |<5 
APR 41990 
1 all taxes owing, pertaining to said property, up to the date of 
2 closing of said sale. 
3 C. All personalty in her possession and/or under her 
4 respective control, including bank accounts in her name. It is 
5 further 
6 ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that husband is awarded as 
•j his sole and separate property, free and clear of any interest in 
g the wife, the following: 
g A. All personalty in his possession and or under his 
respective control, icnluding bank accounts in his name; 
B. All employment benefits which he may be entitled to 
1^ J| through his employment; 
C. An equal share in the proceeds of the home located in 
Logan, Utah, on the terms and conditions as heretofore set forth. 
It is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that both parties are awarded 
the joint legal custody of Cody, with the primary residence for 
Cody being provided by father/respondent,with unlimited rights of 
visitation awarded to the mother. It is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that respondent be and is 
hereby required to absorb the sole financial responsibility for 
the support of Cody and to pay all college expenses, including 
room and board,tuition, books, lab fees, and transportation, if 
Cody enrolls in a post-high school institution of higher learning 
or vocational institution to terminate at age twenty-two or attain-j 
ment of a basic degree, whichever is first to occur. It is further! 
10 
11 
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26
 II ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that respondent is to pay 
to petitioner the amount of $860 per month as and for maintenance 
to terminate only upon petition^^gemacriage or death. 
29 || DONE IN OPEN COURT this day of September, 1980. 
31 Presented by: JUDGE/COURT COMMISSIONER 
32
 II of ANDERSON & FIELDS INC., P.i." ANDERSON & FIELDS INC., P.S. 
Attorneys for Petitioner AHORNCYS AT uw 
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RECEIVED 
OCT 2 0 1980 
KING COUNFY SUPLRIOR 
COURT CLERK'S Oi»'.t.r. 
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY 
In Re the Marriage of: 
GRACE DONOHUE, 
Petitioner, 
AND 
THOMAS J. DONOHUE, 
Respondent. 
NO. 80-3-04990-2 
FINDINGS OF FACT & 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
BE IT REMEMBERED that the above captioned matter came on duljj 
and regularly for nearing before the undersigned, one of the judges 
of the above entitled court, on the date last shown below, heard 
testimony, and deeming itself fully advised in the premises, now, 
therefore, the court does make t;he following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I. 
The parties were married on October 4, 1952, in Detroit, 
Michigan. The marriage is registered in Wayne County. 
II. 
At the time the filing of the petition for dissolution the 
petitioner wao a resident of the state of Washington. 
III. 
90 days have elapsed since the service of the petition for 
legal separation and the amended petition for dissolution upon the 
respondent, who was personally served with copies of said petitions 
and subpoenas pertaining thereto. 
// 
Findings of Fact & 
rnnMiuions of Law - 1 ANDERSON & FIELDS INC., P.S. 
1 II IV. 
2 There is one child born issue of the marriage of the parties J 
3 to wit, Cody T. Donohue, age 15 
4 V 
5 Both parties are fit and proper persons to have the care, 
6 custody and control of the dependent child of the parties 
7 VI 
g The parties own: 
9 II 1. 13 acres of unimproved property located in Logan; 
Utah, legally described as per attachment, and 
JO || has an approximate value of $100,000; 
w\\ 2. A home located in Logan, Utah, which has a net 
value after the payment of the underlying en-
12 cumbrance of approximately $60,000; 
11 3. Personalty of nominal value in the possession of 
" " each • 
14 
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20 
21 
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31 
32 
4. Bank accounts of nominal value in cheir individual 
names; 
5. Employment benefits through the respondent's 
employment of unknown value; 
VII. 
The parties have had six children thtoughout their 29 
year marriage, only one of whom is emancipated and concerning whom 
the petitioner stayed home and gave up career opportunities to 
rear and take care of. In reason years, particularly, the respondent] 
pursuant to his employment would leave the home for periods of up 
to a year before returning. 
VIII. 
Respondent currently earns the sum of $5,200 per month as 
take home pay plus additional per diems through his employment 
while the petitioner has meager, part time employment and has never 
earned more than a net of approximately $275 in any given month. 
IX. 
That the marriage is irretrievably broken. 
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court does 
now make the following: 
Findings & Com* l *»«*-•• 
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1 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
2 1. That the court has Jurisdiction over the parties and 
3 subject matter of this lawsuit; 
4 II 2. That a Decree of Dissolution should enter dissolving 
5 the marriage of the parties; 
^ || 3. That the court has the requisition jurisdiction to 
7 divide all property owned by the parties located both within and 
g without the State of Washington; 
Q 4. That a just and equitable division of the property 
and debts of the parties, giving full consideration to all of the 
factors that RCW 26.09 et seq., requires the court to consider 
and the developing case law pertaining thereto; that a just and 
equitable division of the property, particularly considering the 
role that petitioner has played as homemaker, length of marriage 
and provided and rearing of parties six children and further the 
disparity which exists between the earning capacity of the husband 
and that of the wife, the court deems the following to be a just 
and equitable division of the property and obligations of the 
parties: 
A. That the wife should be awarded, free and clear 
of any interest of husband, except as herein specifically 
provided: 
1. 13 acres located in Logan, Utah; 
2. The home located in Logan, Utah, which home 
should be sold and after payment of closing costs and under-
^ lying mortgage payment, the proceeds divided equally 
26 II between petitioner and respondent. Each should be required 
27 to bear any capital gains that may be occasioned, propor-
28 tionally with the respective proceeds that each is paid 
29 and further that respondent should be required to pay all 
30 taxes owing, pertaining to said property, up to the date 
31 of closing of said sale. 
32 Findings & Conclusions - 3 
ANDERSON & FIELDS INC., P.S. 
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1 3. All personalty in her possession and/or under her 
2 control, including bank accounts in her name. 
3 II B. The husband should be awarded as his sole and separate 
4 property, free and clear of any interest in the wife, except as 
5 herein specifically provided, the following: 
6 11 1. All personalty in his possession and/or under his 
7 control, icnlduing bank accounts in his name; 
g II 2. All employment benefits to which he may be entiled 
g through his employment; 
3. An equal share in the proceeds of the home located 
in Logan, Utah, on the terms and conditions as are hereto-
fore set forth. 
5. That both parties should be awarded the joint, legal 
custody of theparties1 son, Cody, with the primary residence for 
Cody to be provided by the father/respondent with unlimited right 
of visitation awarded to mother. 
6. That respondent should be required to absorb the sole 
financial responsibility for the support of Cody and to pay all 
college expenses, icnlduing room and board, tuition, books and 
lab fees in addition to transportation, if Cody enrolls in a post-
high school institution of higher learning or vocational insittu-
tion, to terminate at age twenty-two or attainemnt of a basic 
degree, whichever is first to occur. 
7. That respondent should pay and petitioner should be 
awarded the amount of $860 per month as and for maintenance to 
25 
29 
terminate only upon her remarriage or death. 
26 xhe Court having made its Conclusions of Law, now, there-
27 
fore let an appropriate Decree of Dissolution be prepared and entered. 
OCT 2 0 1980, 
28 (J DONE IN OPEN COURT t h i s day of September, 1980. 
JUbCE/COURT CdMMiSSttoElR— 
30 II Presented by: 
31 „ 
of ANDERSON & FIELDS INC., P.S. 
32 || Attorneys for Petitioner ANDERSON A CIC 1 r%«* ««-•-
EXHIBIT B 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into at Logan, Cache* County, 
Utah, the 30 day of June, 19B5, by and between GRACE K. DONOHUE, 
hereinafter referred to and designated as "Seller", and JEFFRY B. 
and MICHELLE S. JACOBSEN, jointly and severally hereinafter 
referred to and designated as "Buyer". 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
1. For the consideration and on the terms and conditions 
herein set forth, Seller agrees to sell and Buyer agrees to 
purchase that certain real property and improvements thereon 
located in Cache County, Utah, and more particularly described as 
follows: 
All of Lot 15 of Block 2, Mountain View, as shown by 
the Plat of said sub-division filed the 26th day of 
February, 1959, as filing no* 296424 in the Office of 
the Recorder of Cache County, Utah. 
2. Buyer aqrees to pay for said real property the principal 
sum of $68,000*00, plus interest at the rate of ten (10%) percent 
per annum, both principal and interest payable in lawful money of 
the United States of America, strictly within the following times: 
(a) $1,000.00 cash down prior to Buyer taking pos-
session of the premises on June 15, 1985i 
(b) $14,000.00 cash down upon the execution and 
delivery of this Agreement on or before July 1, 1985j 
(c) The balance of the purchase price in the amount 
of $53,000,00, plus interest at the rate of ten per-
cent per annum shall be evidenced by a promissory 
note a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A"* 
Said promissory note and the terms and conditions 
thereof are hereby made a part of this Agreement by 
reference. 
(d) The balance of the purchase price of $53,000.00 
together with interest from the 1st day of July, 1985, 
at'the rate of ten (10%) percent per annum on the 
unpaid principal shall be payable as follows: 
(1) $48,000.00 together with 6aid interest therec 
in monthly payments of $515.81 on August 1, 1985r wit 
a like payment due on the first day of each month 
thereafter until August 1, 2000, on which day the 
unpaid balance of this contract together with accrued 
interest thereon are due and payable and shall be pai 
In full. 
(2) An additional payment of $5,250.00 shall be 
made on January 1, 1986. The $5,000.00 amount shall 
be applied to the principal amount and the $250.00 
amount shall be applied to six months of interest 
accrued on $5,000.00. 
(e) The aforementioned monthly installments shall 
be applied first to the payment of interest, and 
second, to the reduction of the principal amount 
of the purchase price. Buyer shall have the right 
to prepay any and all amounts set forth herein. 
3. The closing of this transaction shall occur on or befoi 
July 1, 1985, or as soon thereafter as possible. The closing oi 
this transaction shall take place at the office of Harris, 
Preston, Gutke 4 Chambers, Logan, Utah, or such other place 
designated by agreement of the parties hereto. 
At the closing, Buyer and Seller shall deposit in cash < 
by certified check all funds required of it to be paid at the 
closing and Seller shall deliver good and sufficient executed 
instruments and documents necessary to transfer and convey title 
to the property and otherwise carry out the purpose and intent ol 
this Agreement. Said instruments and documents to be executed an 
delivered by Seller include, but are not limited to, the followln 
(a) This Agreement; 
(b) Warranty Deed conveying subject property from 
Seller to Buyer. 
Buyer shall execute and deliver to the closing agent the 
following instruments and documents: 
(a) This Agreement* 
(b) Promissory Note and Deed of Trust. 
4. Possession of said premises shall be delivered to Buyer 
on June 15, 1985. 
5. Buyer agrees at all* times during the term of this 
Agreement and Trust Deed and until the purchase price is paid in 
fullf to keep all insurable improvements on said property insured 
against fire and general hazards for an amount not less than the 
total unpaid balance under this contract. Said insurance shall be 
written with a reputable insurance company in the name of Buyer 
with a mortgage clause in favor of Seller insuring her interests. 
6. Within ten (10) days after the execution and delivery of 
this Agreement and the warranty deed and Deed of Trust referred to 
in paragraph 3, Seller agrees to provide Buyer with an owner's 
policy of title insurance from a qualified title insurer of her 
choice on the real property subject of this Agreement, insuring 
said property against all liens and encumbrances, except the stan-
dard exceptions in policies of title insurance issued by American 
Title Insurance Company, except easements of record, the excep-
tions provided in this Agreement, and except the Trust Deed from 
Buyer to Seller. The premium for said policy shall be paid by 
Seller. 
7. In the event there are anv liens or encumbrances against 
said property other than those herein provided for or referred to, 
or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein pro-
vided for shall hereafter accrue against the same by acts or 
neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at its option, pay and 
discharge the same and receive credit on the amount then remaining 
due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and 
therafter the payments herein provided to be made, may, at the 
option of the Buyer, be suspended until such time as such 
suspended payments shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid. 
8. It Is agreed that time is the essence of this Agreement. 
9. A, Buyer agrees to make all payments under this 
Agreement, Promissory Note and Trust Deed to Logan Savings 6 
Loan Association of Logan, Utah, unless otherwise directed by 
notice signed by Seller or noted hereon. Upon Buyer's 
failure to comply with the terms and conditions of this 
Agreement Logan Savings & Loan Association is hereby 
directed to notify Seller of such failure to comply. 
B. It is agreed that in case Logan Savings & Loan 
Association sees fit to notify the Buyer that payments are 
due hereunder, or past due, that said actions are done only 
for the convenience of the parties and that Logan Savings * 
Loan Association has no obligation to give said notice, nor 
shall the giving of said notice by Logan Savings & Loan 
Association create any liability on its part. 
C. It is understood by the parties that Logan Savings 
6 Loan Association does not quarantee to collect any payment 
provided in this contractf or pay the taxes on the property 
or to insure the 6ame and shall not be responsible or liable 
for any damage to 6aid property. 
10* Concurrent with the execution and delivery of this 
Agreementf Seller agrees to execute, acknowledge and deliver to 
Buyer a warranty deed conveying title to said real property, and 
Buyer agrees to execute, acknowledge and deliver to Seller a Pro-
missory Note and a Deed of Trust on the real property subject of 
this Agreement to Logan Savings & Loan Association as Trustee for 
Seller as beneficiary to secure the Promissory Note referred to in 
paragraph 2(b). 
11. Seller represents that all real property taxes and 
assessments on said premises are paid through December 31, 1984 
and Buyer agrees to pay all real property taxes and all assessmenti 
of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed or 
levied against said real property for the 1985 year. However, 
Seller shall reimburse Buyer for real property taxes and all 
assessments of every kind which are assessed against said pro-
perty, from January 1, 1985 to June 14, 1985. Said reimbursement 
shall be made to Buyer within 15 days of the date Buyer pays the 
1985 real property taxes and assessments. If Seller does not make 
the above stated payment within 15 days of the date the 1985 real 
property taxes and assessments are paid then Buyer is entitled to 
set off the amount* Buyer owes Seller from any monthly payment or 
payments made under this contract. 
12. In the event of failure to comply with the terms hereof 
by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make any payment 
when the same shall become due, or within 30 days thereafter the 
Seller, at her option shall have the following alternative 
remedies: 
A. Seller shall have the right upon failure of the 
Buyer to remedy the default within fifteen days after written 
notice, to be released from all obligations in law and in 
equity to convey said property, and all payments which have 
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be 
forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for the non-
performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the 
Seller may at her option re-enter and take possession of said 
premises without legal process, as in its first and former 
estate, together with all improvements and additions made by 
the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements 
shall remain with the land to become the property of the 
Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the 
Selleri or 
D. The Seller mav bring suit and recover judgment for 
all delinquent installments, including costs and attorney's 
fees. (The U6e of this remedy on one or more occasions shall 
not prevent the Seller, at her option, from resorting to one 
of the other remedies hereunder, in the event of a subsequent 
default)) or 
C. The Seller shall have the right, at her option, and 
upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire 
unpaid balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may 
elect to treat this contract as a note and mortgage, and pass 
title to the Buyer subject thereto, proceed immediately to 
close the same in accordance with the laws of the State of 
Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to 
the payment of the balance owing, including costs and 
attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judqment for any 
deficiency which may remain. In the case of foreclosure, the 
Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be 
immediately entitled to the appointment of a receiver to take 
possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rents, 
issues and profits therefrom and apply the same to the 
payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pur-
suant to order of the court? and the Seller upon entry of 
judgment of foreclosure shall be entitled to possession of 
said premises during the period of redemption. 
13. Seller and Buyer agree that each is to pay their own 
attorney1s fees for the preparation of this Agreement and one-half 
of all fees and charges of Logan Savings & Loan Association for 
conducting the services referred to in paragraph 9 of this 
Agreement* 
14. It is expressly understood between Buyer and Seller that 
this contract and the documents referred to herein have been pre-
pared by Harris, Preston, Gutke h Chambers, attorneys at law; that 
Harris, Preston, Gutke 4 Chambers have been retained as attorneys 
to prepare this contract at the insistance and request of Buyer 
and in so doing, Harris, Preston, Gutke t Chambers are not acting 
as attorneys for Seller. Seller acknowledges that she has had 
explained to her her right to retain independent legal counsel 
or such other advice as they may deem in their best interests to 
review this Agreement and the terms, provisions and conditions 
thereof, and that this contract is entered into between Buyer and 
Seller after having received such advice and counsel and after 
having made such examination and having sought such advice and 
counsel as they deem in their respective best interests. 
15. This Agreement and the Warranty Deed, Promissory Note and 
Trust Deed referred to herein constitutes the entire agreement of 
the parties. All negotiations, representations, warranties and 
other agreements between the parties are merged herein. Buyer 
accepts the property subject to this Agreement in its condition 
of the date hereof and there are no representations as to the 
condition of said property and the improvements thereon other U 
as set forth in this Agreement. 
16. As used in this Agreement, the term "Seller" shall 
include all sellers, whether one or more* the term •'Buyer'1 shall 
include all buyers, whether one or morei and the masculine shall 
include the feminine and the feminine the masculine when the con* 
text so requires. 
17. The terms of this Agreement shall be binding upon and 
shall inure to the benefits of the parties hereto, their respec-
tive heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns. 
18. That Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default 
in any of the covenants or agreements contained herein the 
defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from 
enforcing this Agreement or in obtaining possession of the 
premises covered hereby or in pursing any remedy provided 
hereunder or by the laws of the State of Utah, whether such remedy 
is pursued by filing a suit or otherwise. 
19. There is no real estate commission due any party as a 
result of this transaction. 
20. All notices given under this contract shall be sent to 
Buyer, Seller and the escrow holder. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their hands 
on the day and first above written. 
SELLER: 
"TVy^ f tr 'J*— A" * / { ^ ~? *~«*Xo<S~£— 
Grace K. Donohue 
Miche 
STATE QF WASHINGTON ) 
! SS 
County of King ) 
On the 3c? day of \"Z?<ng— # 1985, personally appeared before 
me, Grace K. Donohue, the signer of the within instrument, who 
duly acknowledged to me that she executed the same-ie executed the same. •? 
i i
 7, Notary Public 
Commission expires: „ ' ' * 1 ,r ^ 
Residing at: ^,V.. CVv^ZL flWuw-£r>-~ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
County of Cache ) 
On the f}— day of ( t , A * , 1985, personally appeared before me 
Jeffry B. Jacobsen and JttichFlle S. Jacobsen, the signers of the 
within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed 
the same. — 
Commission expires: Pjttj^l 
Residing at: 
(^ _ yy^iu 
/7d 
CLOSING STATEMENT 
SELLERi Grace K. Donohue 
BUYERS: Jeffry B. and Michelle S. Jacobsen 
Prepared byi 
Harris, Preston, Gutke & Chambers 
Attorneys at Law 
31 Federal Avenue 
Loqanf Utah 84321 
(801) 752-3551 
SETTLEMENT STATEMENT 
******************** 
Prorations: 
Property Taxes ( ) Actual 
(XJ Prev. Years $447.41 
Beginninq Year: 1/1/85 
Possession/Proration Date: 6/15/85 
Amount to be prorated* $ 203.76 
Total Closinq or Settlement Fee $ 75.00 
Escrow Fee for Servicing 
Selling/Purchase Price $68,000.00 
Down Payment $ 1,000.00 
First Mortgage or Contract $53,000.00 
Second Mortgage or Contract 
Third Mortgage or Contract 
Title Insurance $ 307.00 
Seller's Recording costs $ 11.00 
Buyerfs Recording costs $ 5.00 
* *
 t t t 
ffjff«?iw4'"" 
*».r,£,le» ** «.SS?» 
°"*xplr5i Tneurar,oe p r . m l 
°ther, ? £ j p r a n c e PrtmunBmFi^ 
Down * f I d e n t l f v , Pre">iun,s-other 
«ei? P a y r n e"t " 
^cordi„ g S U r a n « 
Property
 Tajt „ * 37.5 0 
P r
° ra t l o n Date o r 
°
t h e
" (Mentlfy. . . * 2 0 3 - '« 
»f» Escrow p . ! e w e r ' A t
'orney.e £ / « . e tc . , 
*«8»000. 
* * * * * * * * * 
JOWLS* « . . . . „ „ 
COMMENTS, ***•" *««'00?:^  **"»«... . 
* a?:???;??. 
BUYERS ITEMS DEBITS CREDITS 
Purchase Price $68,000.00 
Reserves: 
Unexpired Ins. Premiums-Fire 
Unexpired Ins. Premiums-Other 
Other* (Identify) 
Attorney^ Fee 
Document Preparation 
Titlet 
Abstract Continuation 
Title Insurance 
Recording 
Other: (Identify) 
Survey 
Closing or Settlement Fee 
Propertv Tax Proration 
to the Date of Possession 
or Proration Date 
Down Payment 
Real Estate Commission 
First Mortgage or contract 
Second Mortgage or Contract 
Third Mortgage or Contract 
Interest on First Prorated 
Interest on Second Prorated 
Interest on Third Prorated 
Other: (Identify-Sewer, Escrow Fee, Etc.) 
«**«**««« ******************************************************** 
TOTALS: $68,042.50 $ 54,203.76 
***************************************************************** 
Balance Due from Buyer: $ 13,838.74 
Balancing Totals: $68,042.50 $ 68,042.50 
***************************************************************** 
$ 5.00 
$ 37.50 
203.76 
$ 1,000.00 
$ 53,000.00 
COMMENTS: 
« * * * 4 4 * « * 4 4 * « * « * « « « + * * * 4 4 « * * * * * * 
Balance Due from Buyer: 
Balance Due to Seller: 
Difference! 
Itemization: 
Title Insurance 
Closing or Settlement Fee 
Recording 
Attorney Fee Doc. Prep, 
Real Estate Commission 
Other (Identify): 
SUB-TOTAL* 
CHECKING TOTAL: 
LAW orr iccft or 
LOGAN DISTRICT 
HENRIKSEN. HENRIKSEN 8 CALL 
A ^HOfKIHONAL CO**0*ATlON # Q | ^ f t « DM • (Ml 
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TELEPHONE (SOI) ftfl-4140 
March 30, 1990 
Thomas L. Willmore, Esq. 
P. 0. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Attention: Pat 
Re: Donahue v. Parish 
Civil No. 87-0026212DC 
Dear Pat: 
Enclosed are copies of Exhibit ME" and HFM which we failed 
to include with our Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion to 
Dismiss and/or Summary Judgment. Please accept our apology for any 
inconvenience this may have caused. 
Sincerely, 
Julie Hempel 
Secretary 
JH/s 
Enclosure 
cc: Cache County Clerk 
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EXHIBIT C 
COMPUTATION OF INTEREST DUE ON ALIMONY ARREARAGE 
AS OF JUNE 30, 1985 
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EXHIBIT D 
LOGAN DISTRICT 
FEB 27 lluI'W'M 
C. RICHARD HENRIKSEN, JR. #1466 
Of HENRIKSEN, HENRIKSEN & CALL, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 521-4145 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS DONAHUE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GRACE (DONAHUE) PARISH, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil NO. 870026212 DC 
Judge Gordon J. Low 
This matter came on for trial on December 17, 1991, before 
the Honorable Gordon J. Low, District Judge presiding. The 
Defendant was present and represented by C. Richard Henriksen, Jr., 
and the Plaintiff was present and represented by Thomas L. 
Willmore. That prior to the commencement of the proceedings, both 
parties waived any objections they may have to having the Honorable 
Gordon J. Low, District Judge, preside at these proceedings, 
including the fact that the Court had previously represented the 
Plaintiff as his attorney some years ago. 
That the Plaintiff was called and testified, and the 
Defendant was called and testified, and various exhibits were 
offered and received by the Court, and after the argument of 
counsel and after due deliberation, the Court hereby 
MICRO FILMED 
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FINDS as follows: 
1» That the interest rate 12% per annum shall apply to 
all alimony arrearage that the Plaintiff owed the Defendant in this 
case pursuant to either Utah law or Washington law. 
2. That the alimony arrearage that the Plaintiff owed 
to the Defendant as of the date of the sale of the Logan home, once 
owned by the parties, June 30, 1985, was larger than the one-half 
(h) of the net equity which was to be awarded to the Plaintiff as 
set forth in Page 1, Paragraph B of the Decree of Dissolution* 
That as of said date, the balance owing after the one-half (h) 
equity in the home is deducted for alimony arrearages was 
$9,322.83. 
3. That the alimony arrearages owing from the Plaintiff 
to the Defendant as of February 28, 1986, the date that alimony 
payments ceased when offset against the equity of the home and the 
payments received on the Logan home, left a balance owing to the 
Defendant after the offset of $16,886.54. 
4. That if the alimony arrearages were to be calculated 
against the offset in the equity in the home up to the date of 
trial, December 17, 1991, the amount of the alimony arrearage would 
be in excess of $16,886.54. 
5. The Court finds that one-half of the sale proceeds 
from the Logan home was to be split evenly between the Plaintiff 
and Defendant pursuant to Page 1, Paragraph B of the Decree of 
Dissolution and was not done at the time. 
6. The Court finds that the alimony ordered by the 
Decree of Dissolution was not paid as set forth in Exhibit 15. 
1. At the time of the sale of the house in 1985 the 
Plaintiff would have been entitled to a maximum of $33,000.00, but 
at which time he was already in arrears in his alimony to a sum 
exceeding that. The best that he could hope for at that point 
2 
would be that when the house was sold that he either had one-half 
of the proceeds from each of the monthly installments or had the 
Defendant elected she could have paid in the $33,000.00. Since he 
was already in default in excess of that figure, his interest in 
the home at that time was liquidated and he was given credit for 
the same against the arrearages leaving a balance owed to the 
Defendant in the sum of $16,000.00. 
8. The Court finds that all interest of the Plaintiff 
is vitiated in the Logan home and all interest or equity in said 
home is completely and entirely owned by the Defendant. 
9. The Court finds that Exhibit 15 setting forth the 
calculations as to the amount of alimony paid with interest and 
the offsets is accurate. The Court finds that at least the sum of 
$16,886.54 is owing by the Plaintiff to the Defendant. 
10. The Court finds that the alimony did not abate 
pursuant to an alleged agreement by the Plaintiff with the 
Defendant for the reason that the Court is not convinced that any 
agreement took place, nor was there any Court Order granting such 
a modification or abatement. The Court also finds that equity does 
not justify any abatement for the Plaintiff. 
11. The Court finds that there were attorney's fees 
expended by the Defendant in the defense and prosecution of this 
matter. However, there was not sufficient evidence to establish 
bad faith or the fact that the Plaintiff had filed his non-
meritorious case and thus, no attorney's fees are awarded. 
After making said findings the Court 
CONCLUDES, ORDERS AND DECREES as follows: 
1. That all right to the interest, equity, or claim 
Plaintiff has in the equity in the Logan home once owned by the 
parties, and sold June 30, 1985, is vitiated. 
3 
2. That Defendant is awarded judgment against Plaintiff 
in the amount of $16,886.54, with interest from date of entry at 
12%. 
3. Each party is to bear their own attorney's fees and 
DATED this (p day Qi\j4^/uJXy> 1992> 
BY THE COURT 
ict Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE QF MAILING 
Up I hereby certify that on this day of February, 
1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the following individual: 
Thomas L. Willmore 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321 
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